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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Peterson Mortgage does not dispute Butterfield's 
supplemental Statement of Facts as stated in Butterfield's brief 
except to point out that paragraph 6 of such Statement of Facts 
which reads "Leon Peterson sold the property to a third party. (R 
at 239).", while correct as far as it goes, would be more complete 
and appropros to the issues in this case if it were to read "Leon 
Peterson sold the property to a third party, which third party had 
no actual or constructive notice of Butterfield Lumber's lien. (R. 
at 239)." 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE BUTTERFIELD FAILED TO TIMELY FILE A 
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS AS CONTEMPLATED BT § 38-
1-11, THE LIEN WAS EXTINGUISHED, AND UNDER S 
38-1-3 BUTTERFIELD HAD NO LIEN ON ANY PROCEEDS 
FROM THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY. 
Butterfield has cited as authority for its position in 
this action seven cases, six of which are from other jurisdictions 
that do not have Utah's Mechanics' Liens Act (the "Act"), and whose 
various lien statutes do not contain the controlling language of 
Utah's Act. 
The sole Utah case relied upon by Butterfield, and which 
Butterfield claims is controlling, is Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co, v. 
Professional United World Travel Association, 592 P.2d 586 (Utah 
1979). Butterfield says of Harris-Dudley: 
1 
As in the instant case, after the initiation 
of the foreclosure action, the subject 
property was conveyed. Notwithstanding the 
absence of a lis pendens, the trial court 
granted a judgment of foreclosure against the 
new corporate owner of the subject property, 
finding it had actual notice of the 
foreclosure action. . . . As was the case in 
Harris Dudley, Peterson Mortgage Mortgage 
[sic] was a party to the foreclosure action 
and is subject to Butterfield Lumber's lien. 
Appellee Brief, at 7, court quote omitted. 
Butterfield has missed the whole point and has neglected 
to inform the Court that in Harris -Dudley, the conveyance was from 
a corporation owned by a Mr. Benton, to a second corporation owned 
by Mr. Benton, to all of whom the Court imputed actual knowledge of 
the pending court action. Harris-Dudley, at 589. Furthermore, the 
second corporation "was present and represented by counsel during 
the trial." Id. 
Unlike Harris-Dudley, in the instant case Leon Peterson 
conveyed the Property to Mr. Wright-Clark, an innocent third-party 
purchaser who took without any actual or constructive notice of the 
pending court action, no lis pendens being of record. Therefore, 
the Harris-Dudley ruling has no application here, because Mr. 
Wright-Clark's interest in the Property was not subject to 
Butterfield's lien and Peterson Mortgage no longer held an interest 
in the Property upon which Butterfield could foreclose. 
Butterfield admits that Wright-Clark is protected by the 
absence of a lis pendens. Appellee Brief, at 6. However, 
Butterfield reveals its misunderstanding of the issues before the 
2 
Court, when it says, "The clear statutory language preserve? 
Butterfield Lumber's lien rights against Peterson Mortgage." The 
statute does not provide for lien rights against a person, it 
merely creates a lien right encumbering real property. The fact 
that Peterson Mortgage was made a "party" to the foreclosure action 
is irrelevant if Peterson Mortgage eventually owned no interest in 
the real property foreclosed. Peterson Mortgage no longer owns any 
such interest. 
Butterfield next attempts to convince the Court that even 
though Peterson Mortgage owned no interest in the real property to 
be foreclosed, Butterfield is entitled to a lien on the proceeds of 
the prior sale of the Property. Butterfield arbitrarily declares 
that Peterson Mortgage's position that the lien attached only to 
its interest in the Property and not to any other real or personal 
property of Peterson Mortgage, is without "any legal or statutory 
authority." Appellee Brief, at 9. Butterfield has ignored and 
apparently expects the Court to ignore the language of the 
controlling statute, § 38-1-3, U.C.A., which provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
Contractors . . . shall have a lien upon 
the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for 
the value of the service rendered . . . . 
This lien shall attach only to such interest 
as the owner may have in the Property. 
(Emphasis added) 
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Section 38-1-3 clearly provides that a statutorily created 
mechanic's lien attaches only to an interest in the property 
itself, which is the real property upon or concerning which 
Butterfield "furnished or rented materials or equipment." 
Butterfield did not render service, perform labor or furnish or 
rent materials or equipment upon or concerning the proceeds from 
any sale of the Property. In other words, other than with respect 
to the Property, Butterfield's lien could not attach to any real or 
personal property owned by anyone. 
We know of no case, when confronted with the clear 
language of the last sentence of our § 38-1-3, that holds that a 
mechanic's lien on real property is somehow converted to a lien on 
the proceeds of the sale of such real property. To support its 
position Butterfield cites Am.Jur. and cases from Alabama, 
Illinois, and Oregon. We have reviewed the controlling statutes 
from these states, none of which statutes contain the unambiguous 
language of § 38-1-3: "This lien shall attach only to such interest 
as the owner may have in the property." Consequently, neither Am. 
Jur. nor such cases tell us anything contrary to § 38-1-3. 
Butterfield cannot cite us to a single case that supports 
Butterfield's position in the face of § 38-1-3. 
A Utah mechanics' lien is a statutory creature and has no 
common law counterpart that can be used where there exist statutory 
deficiencies. Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 
(1906); Utah Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 
4 
P.2d 598 (1961). Butterfield's pleas for relief from its failure 
to protect itself by filing the notice of lis pendens required by 
§ 38-1-11 are not meritorious, and inappropriately ask the Court to 
ignore the plain language of the controlling statute. Th$ 
mechanics' lien statute is intended to prevent the owner of land 
from taking the benefits of improvements placed on his property 
without paying for the labor or material that went into thenu 
Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446 (1967). The 
entities participating in this appeal are both innocent parties, 
neither of whom was the owner of the Property. The trial court was 
apparently impressed that the equities in this case favored 
Butterfield. (See pages 4-6 of the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision of March 1, 1990. R. 240-242). However, in light of the 
plain language of § 38-1-3 of our Utah Code, there is no basis for 
weighing equities. It is simply a matter of determining that 
Butterfield allowed its lien to be extinguished by failing to file 
a notice of lis pendens. 
In this case, the trial court granted relief not even 
sought by Butterfield, since the Complaint against Peterson 
Mortgage only asked for foreclosure of a lien, not a money 
judgment. Instead, the trial court rendered judgment against 
Peterson Mortgage for the amount that the lien secured before it 
was extinguished. Where there exists both a breached construction 
contract, and a valid mechanic's lien on the real property, the 
lienor may pursue the lienor's breach of contract claim or lien 
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foreclosure simultaneously. Harris-Dudley. at 588. However, there 
can be but one satisfaction of the debt, and the lienor must choose 
his remedy as either the lien foreclosure or the money judgment 
based upon breach of the construction contract. JEd. In this case, 
however, there exists no contract betw€>en Peterson Mortgage and 
Butter field, they both being creditors of the owner of the 
Property. Therefore, the trial court was powerless to enter a 
money judgment against Peterson Mortgage, The trial court was also 
powerless to foreclose a lien that had already been extinguished. 
CONCLUSION 
Butterfield has no lien upon or any other rights in the 
proceeds of the sale of the Property to anyone, nor did Butter field 
maintain its lien on the Property itself. Accordingly, the Order 
and Judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial 
court with instructions to dismiss this action as to Peterson 
Mortgage and to determine and award Peterson Mortgage its 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of December, 1990. 
JARD^NR, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
\JLT\P\104.4 
Thompsoi 
s for Defendant and Appellant 
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